Plaintiff architect contended that revocation

The Supreme Court of California remanded the matter of defendant, California Board of Architectural Examiners’ decision to revoke plaintiff architect’s license to the court to decide if it was an excessive sanction. The Supreme Court had reversed the court and concluded that discipline could be imposed pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 5583, 5584 for plaintiff’s conduct that preceded issuance of a license.

Plaintiff architect contended that revocation of his architect’s license was an excessive sanction that constituted an abuse of defendant, California Board of Architectural Examiners’ discretion. The court found that plaintiff had demonstrated gross dishonesty on numerous occasions. The court found that plaintiff Riverside ADA attorney performed architectural work without a license, falsely stated that he had a license and substituted another’s certificate in order to gain admission to an architectural organization, falsely stated on his resume that he had graduated from college and was a registered architect in several jurisdictions, and used the architectural stamps of others on his own work. The court concluded that the public was entitled to be protected from fraud, deceit, and willful misconduct just as much as it was entitled to be protected from shoddy architectural plans or an architect’s embezzlement of client funds. The court affirmed and found that defendant’s decision to revoke plaintiff’s license was well within its discretion.

The court affirmed the judgment of defendant, California Board of Architectural Examiners. The court found that defendant did not abuse its discretion in revoking plaintiff architect’s license.

Plaintiff city appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which denied its claim to quiet title and enjoin defendant cities from extracting water from a river area. On appeal, plaintiff argued its prior adjudicated pueblo right to the water, that its inhabitants needed the water, and that defendants’ taking of the ground water had caused irreparable injury because imported water was more costly.

Plaintiff city filed suit to quiet its title and obtain a declaration of its prior rights to water underlying a river area and to enjoin defendant cities from extracting water other than in subordination to plaintiff’s prior rights. After trial, judgment was entered denying plaintiff’s claims, awarding prescriptive rights to both parties, and imposing continuous restrictions on the parties’ extractions of water. On appeal, plaintiff claimed that it had a pueblo right to all the native ground water, that it needed the water for its inhabitants, and that defendants’ taking of the ground water caused it irreparable injury as imported water was more costly. Defendants argued that plaintiff waived its claim of res judicata by failing to plead its prior adjudged pueblo right. The principal judgement was reversed, and the cause was remanded because plaintiff had a pueblo right to all ground water derived from prescription, defendants had a prior right to all basin ground water, defendants were barred by collateral estoppel from denying plaintiff’s adjudged prior right, and each of the parties imported water rights were mutually exclusive and of equal priority.

The judgment of the trial court denying plaintiff city’s water right claims and to enjoin defendant cities from extracting water from a river area was reversed, and the case was remanded because plaintiff had a pueblo right to all the ground water derived from prescription, defendants were collaterally estopped from denying such right, and plaintiff and defendants had mutually exclusive and equal priority rights to imported water.